Mapping new security challenges

Resulting analyses of:

YOUNG DIPLOMACY PROFESSIONALS FORUM
SEE REVIEW is quarterly Journal of the YATA South – Eastern Working Group and it is published by YATA Macedonia.

SEE REVIEW aims to inform and raise debate on the key regional issues and beyond.

SEE REVIEW will primarily inform the broader public, but will also present an open forum for developing dialogue concerning the security challenges through public debates.

The Journal will develop a debate on regional security concepts, the new democratic reality and Euro-Atlantic roots of the region, and will analyze the security challenges faced in the region and beyond to provide workable solutions for the future of SEE!

Mapping new security challenges

All the views expressed in the articles of this issue are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the South - East European Review editorial board or of the YATA SEE Working Group.

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Dear readers,

I am glad to welcome you and represent you to the second issue of the YATA South East European Review journal. The Atlantic Treaty Association and the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association, as international civil society organizations have always promoted the positive sides, and suggesting necessary changes in South East Europe. Through a strong cooperation with the civil and the governmental authorities, from the early nineties, this organization has been dedicated to promoting the importance of transatlantic values, showing a strong case for the region.

Since 1949, NATO has been the cornerstone of the Trans-Atlantic security system. NATO’s main purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. In its political manner, NATO promotes democratic values and encourages consultation and cooperation on defense and security issues to build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict. In terms of military, NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts. For example, if the diplomatic efforts fail, NATO has the military capacity and the capability to undertake crisis-management operations. Under the slogan of “cooperative security”, during the last two decades, NATO has developed an organized network of partnerships with 41 partner countries and with other international actors and organizations across the globe.

The Alliance is committed to keeping NATO’s door open to Western Balkan partners that wish to join the Alliance, share its values and are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. Euro-Atlantic integration is seen as the best way to ensure long-term, self-sustaining security and stability in the region.

SEE Review is a product of inspired group of Atlanticists, from the region and abroad. Individuals, who strongly believe in the importance of working together, strengthening the Atlantic ties across different countries, discuss the new security threats and bring innovative ideas and arguments on how to solve them.

The focus of the first issue of SEE Review was on the NATO 63rd Anniversary. This number aims at collecting innovative ideas and arguments on the several topics such as: “The Danger of Ideologically Primed Security Measures,” “Why Suicide Terrorism is Rational and What This Means for Counter-Terrorism Officials,” “Cooperation in South East Europe: common vision for regional security,” “Regionalization of armed forces: a short term solution for a long term problem,” “Synergy of NATO and EUFOR in post conflict restoration management in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” “Afghanistan after 2014 and Regional Security,” “European Union: A Global Superpower?,” “Transatlantic Shifts: Who is Calling the Shots?,” and “Eastern Partnerships (EaP) - From Vilnius to Riga and the Way Ahead.”

At the very end, I must mention that I look forward to the promising General Assembly in Brussels, which will take place in December 2013, where YATA will elect the new Executive Board and trace the road for the upcoming challenges in promoting Atlanticism across the world. For this event and many other events, we will come back with more in the next issue of SEE Review.

Finally, my greatest congratulation goes to the Atlantic Treaty Association and Youth Atlantic Treaty Association, but also to the whole team of SEE Review and all the authors of this issue. Moreover, my special thanks and congratulations go to Mr. Giuseppe Belardetti, the Secretary General of ATA, for always being a motivator and supporter of such ideas.

Ilija Djugumanov, President of YATA Macedonia, YATA Vice-President for Public Diplomacy
The Danger of Ideologically Primed Security Measures

A little less than a month ago, David Cameron, Prime Minister of the U.K. and head of the Conservative Party in Britain, announced the adoption of a law that effectively cut off pornographic content distribution in the public domains of the Internet by gouging access, effectively rendering most porn searches in Britain a waste of time in what regards finding actually pornographic material.

Moralists and bible pushers may have echoed support, but this measure will only worsen matters. From a conservative stand-point this is the worst possible idea – mainly if we consider the internal security and anti-crime intentions that preclude the law to begin with.

Stopping child pornography production and online distribution cannot be achieved by prohibiting healthy, mentally stable citizens from accessing all properly surveyed domains of common-place Internet that provide pornographic material. In any normal web search (for whatever content, be it pornographic or otherwise) the IP of the Internet user is registered and a monitoring of the content transferred back and forth takes place – which is then stored in private servers, or should be, Verizon debacle notwithstanding. All regular internet searches in any regular web-browser (from Google Chrome to Internet Explorer) function in this way.

One does not find child pornography by Googling it or visiting off-the mill websites. And when this does happen in less popular but still publically surveyed web-sites — either by the servers’ authorities or by the ISP —, often the uploader goes unpunished because he or she knows exactly how to bypass decryption protocols and hide their IP. Only the person seeing or saving the content gets detected since he or she are already surfing a publically surveyed domain in any case.

What does this mean security and investigation wise? It’s quite simple, but often the push for more votes clouds the minds of lawmakers, who by some unexplainable and ancient twist of the system tend to be politicians; it means that most of the people being prosecuted for child pornographic downloading and distribution are nothing more than perverts on the receiving end.

At times following the trail will lead to bigger apprehensions of ‘middle-men’ distributors, using less secure encryptions to mask their connections and uploads, but who have the most particularly disgusting hard-drives in their possession which might even lead to finding missing children.

And some times, proper investigation work churns out deeper connections from these middle-men and leads to the apprehension of individuals connected and directly acting within pedophile rings or child pornography production networks. Furthermore, investigating individuals who aren’t prone to covering their Internet connections but are particularly keen on procuring such materials may at times lead to the unfortunate truth of home-made child pornography and criminal abuse.
One should note how all of this stems from one fact: there is no block to the search for pornography on publically surveyed internet domains, from search engines to upload sites and image boards — metaphorically speaking it’s exactly that freedom which creates an open field for careless stragglers to be caught and thereafter lead to bigger, more influential criminals.

Eradicating the freedom for pornographic material search also eliminates this field, and has an incredibly dangerous side effect: it may push citizens to search for basic satisfaction within easy-to-use encrypted browsers (accompanied by easily found guides). Cyber-security effectively deals in a two dimensional paradigm of transnationality. On one hand you have the communication dimension, since cyber space is transnational by default; on the other hand it implies the massive usage of its functionalities by intelligent agents throughout the world who can instantly share information — and, most importantly, teach one another how to mask that sharing of data.

To better put forth the reverse effect of what was intended with this law, we may remember the disastrous example of Prohibition in the U.S., a similar set of laws that sought to stem the tide of immorality in America (supposedly originating in drinking habits) and ended up promoting the expansion of the Mafia, near-toxic bootleg alcohol production and pusher rings which then surrounded themselves of shadier businesses — including prostitution and human trafficking which were quite profitable for the Mafia families which actually flourished during the times of Prohibition and the respective alcohol trafficking it wrought.

The effect of this law will be all too familiar. Just as Prohibition drove common citizens who used to just visit the local bar in plain sight into underground drinking — thus making their behavior more inaccessible to public observation, and funding criminal activity —, this law will not protect children from viewing pornographic content in the long run nor will it stem the tide of child pornography production...on the terrible contrary.

This law might effectively lead the average British internet user (older than 18 or not) into searching for alternative ways of Internet browsing so that he or she may access pornographic content online at his/her leisure. In turn, it’ll definitely lead almost everyone susceptible to observation and investigation into encrypted web browsing, which is accessible through downloadable software applications and has a wide-spectrum potential which is only limited by the technical proficiency and the guided skill of the user.

In fact, this law will promote a lack of systemic surveillance and create loopholes in connection information which will not only allow for pedophile rings to thrive, but also perverts to go more undetected and thus freeze a lot of potential leads.

And for the sake of practical arguing in what concerns kids seeing pornographic material, one should ask if all nude magazines should have been burned because kids tried to sneak them away from their father’s precariously hidden stashes.

In what regards child pornography, this law contradicts its own intention through its inherent material and long-term effect — and it’s an unspoken but heavy truth that such horrible content can only be stopped at the source of production, which often implies human investigation, intelligence and keen communitarian, social and educational awareness toward warning signs regarding sexual abuse in children.

One should always be careful when vaunted moralist speech becomes grounds for laws. Nor moral musings based on concerns that are timeless, nor fear of an objectively very scary crime, may drive desperation behind lawmaking. Desperation in security policy and law leads to no great deeds, but rather to errors that are remembered for their irreparable, long-term damage.

Mr. Cameron was not a Conservative when he did this, on the contrary, he was a social engineer of the most abject promethean nature, believing a needlessly and indiscriminately repressive law and enforced limitations on basic freedoms — as modern as they may be — would shape a secure society to the likings of a more moral world.

It will not do so. What this law will bring is simply more insecurity, uncertainty and cyber-based crime. This is not to say there shouldn’t be laws against the several criminal activities, such as child pornography in its entire spectrum, but one must be attentive to not criminalize that which is not criminal (such as looking at normal pornographic material) for the sake of moral security. This is not wise, it does not promote security in the long-run and it constitutes a grave distortion of fundamental concepts to security policy construction.

Furthermore, one must note that the harder a State pushes surveillance and blocks into common-domain cyber-space, the more a State will promote encrypted browsing and therefore bring about severe complications to proper surveillance, more costly allocation of public resources to investigation efforts, and a strenuous stretch of security oriented resources. If a decision-maker wishes to promote greater cyber-security — and security in general to a certain degree — the point of departure lies fundamentally outside of that spectrum.

Firstly, in what regards short to mid-term effects, there must be investment in Youth employment, particularly of the technically and technologically skilled intelligent young men and women who are left outside of the job market circuit for several reasons, either structurally inadequate or lack of relevant opportunities — their frustration constitutes one of the potential sources of widespread insecurity waiting in the horizon. Secondly, concerning long-term effects, states need to take a long, hard look at population policies and the widespread, inter-connected impacts they have in security. In sum, a new dialogue needs to be embraced; one based on utilitarianism and objectivity, not on moralist postulations.
Why Suicide Terrorism is Rational and What This Means for Counter-Terrorism Officials

Modern suicide terrorism first appeared in the 1980s and has expanded in its use and intensity ever since. Having been a favoured strategy by a range of terrorist organizations, the groups that have made the most sophisticated and strategic use of suicide attacks have included: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), al-Qaeda and many others. As the favoured strategy of many terrorist organizations, it is important to understand the rationality behind this tactic in order to develop an effective strategy that can be applied by counter-terrorism officials to help thwart, reduce and ultimately defeat the use of suicide terrorism.

It must first be understood that the root causes of suicide bombings are embedded in their success at spreading fear and anxiety amongst a population and their ability to successfully coerce political concessions from states (especially democratic ones). Due to their success rate, it is important to understand that the strategy of suicide attacks is a rational conclusion resulting from a terrorist organization's cost benefit analysis for the following five reasons.

First, suicide bombings are inexpensive and effective. On average they cost less than $150 to mount, don't require any escape plan and can kill up to four times as many people as other types of attacks.

Second, they are less complicated and compromising than other forms of terrorism. They are less complicated because they only require basic supplies such as pipes, batteries, wires, bolts and fertilizer rather than sophisticated or high-tech materials. They are less compromising because there is no chance that the terrorist can surrender any information under interrogation because his/her death is certain.

In addition, suicide attacks have a low rate of failure. If all goes to plan, terrorist organizations are protected against the devastating effects of humiliation, thus enhancing the network’s popularity and recruitment capabilities.

Third, they guarantee media coverage. Although coverage may not always be extensive, the media is driven to focus on suicide attacks because of the high rate of casualties and their shock effect on viewers. This often helps to mobilize support for the terrorists’ cause and allows the “romanticism” of the act of suicide terrorism in the public mind, aiding a terrorist group’s recruitment efforts.

Fourth, suicide bombers can change their location, timing or target at the last minute, giving them the ability to maximize casualties and devastation, making them the ultimate smart bomb.

Fifth, by targeting places where large civilian populations regularly congregate, suicide bombings give the impression that people aren’t safe anywhere, thus creating a level of anxiety and fear that is not easy to contain.

What This Means for Counter-Terrorism Officials

Understanding this rationale of a terrorist network provides any security force with three key advantages over its adversaries.

First, it provides insight into their motivations, tactics and capabilities, the understanding of which are vital for counter-terrorism officials and policy makers so they can create effective ways in responding to the threat of suicide attacks.

Second, once the rationale of suicide attackers is understood, security forces can increase their capability to predict future targets, disrupt terrorist cells and thwart attacks in advance.

Third, understanding the process of rationalization allows security agencies to work together in tracking, infiltrating, managing and deterring suicide terrorism. Central to this strategy is the promotion of a counter argument for potential suicide attackers. In many cases this would require a clerically endorsed religiously based counter-narrative that is designed to dissuade and delegitimize suicide attacks. Promoting such a counter argument will undercut the recruitment capabilities of terrorist networks and disrupt the “tunnel vision” of a suicide attacker in the final stages of an attack. This creates an effective way for counter-terrorism officials to use the rationale of their adversaries to change their own way of thinking, help deplete their ranks as well as undermine their legitimacy amongst their own supporters.

Successful application of this strategy would not only build deterrence against suicide attacks but would allow counter-terrorism operatives to go on the offensive and direct their efforts at pursuing, apprehending and assassinating the leaders of terrorist networks. Only a strategy that combines countering the motivation and the operational capacity of a terrorist network can be successful in defeating their use of suicide terrorism.
Since the early days of the new geopolitical design in South East Europe, after the end of the Cold War, there was a rare consensus on the future orientation of the region. The consensus for the regional security in the future had to be managed between the countries and the international security organizations.

Even though, the need for security cooperation in the region was recognized by all concerned actors, in the early nineties, countries lacked the necessary trust to cooperate with each other. Both old and new countries realized the need for complete regional integration into Euro-Atlantic security structure, but beside this, countries needed external initiatives to encourage them for further cooperation. The old problems between the countries started to rise again and few bilateral problems became an obstacle for further cooperation.

Luckily for the region security, South Eastern European countries, together with the good willing of the international organizations, started to create initiatives for security cooperation that will help them to get close to each other and to commonly overtake the security challenges.

In this manner, NATO started the Partnership for peace program in order to encourage the region to cooperate and to increase the level of trust. This program helped the member states to reform towards the NATO standards while working together with NATO member states and the partners from the region. Thus, the program created the future patterns for cooperation and can be stated that it used as an icebreaker and role model for the future regional security programs and initiatives.

Another important step in the direction of further integration was the Bulgarian initiative for the South – East European Cooperation Process. This process brings very important novelty in the process of creating cooperation frame in SEE, because it was launched by country from the region instead of outside international organization which is strong signal that countries in the region realize the need to exercise the declarative notion for security cooperation.

The initiatives gained trust, but in some points missed the opportunity to manage the bilateral issues between the countries members because the political leaders and policy makers didn’t recognized it as a place that can help the countries to resolve their problems by their own without intervention from actors outside the South East Europe cooperation frame.

In this direction, it should be mentioned here, that new cooperation methods have to be developed. Current methods of cooperation in some points have shown that they can be ineffective, especially when there are politically sensitive questions that matter, and in some cases countries showed that the domestic public opinion is more important to them than the regional cooperation and integration.

If this policy continues in the future, it can decrease the will of security cooperation and discourage the countries to recognize this approach in further security policy planning.
Nevertheless, countries in South East Europe consent that modern security threats require actions run by multiple actors and countries in South East Europe have to develop already existing cooperation initiatives, enrich them with new capabilities and actions, but also to explore opportunities to create new cooperation frameworks. The managing of the modern security threats includes activities that should overcome the state borders in order to be resolved permanently.

Thus, NATO Smart defense concept has to be considered as a method that provides a real chance to the countries in South East Europe. Even though, the concept primarily is designed with austerity in mind, this concept offers more opportunities for cooperation than just finding ways for more moderate military spending. Having in mind that, not the entire SEE region is integrated in NATO, Smart Defense can be an especially positive milestone because it offers cooperation between NATO member states and their partners. This opportunity has to be closely considered by the SEE countries and they should seize this opportunity to develop the level of cooperation. South East Europe’s NATO members together with their regional partners can use the Smart Defense concept in order to increase the trust through sharing the countries capabilities. Having in mind, the limited capabilities and the current economic problems in the whole SEE region, the NATO Smart defense concept has the capability to unite the countries to pursue in-depth cooperation that will result with preparedness to manage the modern security threats.

South East Europe is a characteristic region that serves as a crossroad for the transfer of the organized crime activities from East to West, as well as, a main route and accommodation hub for the global terrorist networks. Furthermore, the region has to manage the transportation networks of illegal immigrants from Middle East and North Africa to the western countries.

These threats should serve as an additional motivation for the SEE countries for further recognition of the need for security cooperation. Together with the international organizations such NATO, OSCE and EU, countries have to develop modern approaches to commonly deal with mentioned modern threats. If these threats are not dealt through cooperation, they can easily become serious threat to the security in the region, as well as, the security of the whole Euro-Atlantic Area.

To conclude, no modern threat can be dealt with by only one actor. Multilayered threats of today require multiple actors with various capabilities. This approach can be successfully exercised by cooperation by the SEE countries among themselves and with coordination with the international security organizations. The recipe for a secure SEE region lies only in comprehensive approach practiced with common vision by all concerned actors that care about a safe future.

Huxley in his novel, Brave New World, has described a strange world that was not feasible or imaginable in the 30s, but is becoming a reality of today. Globalisation has changed many political definitions and ideologies, while at the same time modifying ontological perspectives that they are based on. What I am going to write, or at least try to show, is that regionalisation, as armed forces in Europe see it today, is an old and obsolete term and will give us a short term financial bandage for the harsh reality of the armed forces becoming extremely expensive due to high-tech forces transformation and the consequent loss of value and operability while maintaining forces on a national level. Furthermore I will not view regions based on continents but regions based on a global perspective. In the first part I will talk about the procurement costs of military equipment and maintenance and how forces change military policies, and in the second part, how regionalism in Europe is still seen as a cooperation between neighbouring countries and how this will not solve the problem but make new ones while postponing the goal of ensuring European forces of becoming equal partners in NATO.
For the past 20 years, military doctrine in the West, and increasingly also in the East, was to integrate specialised and high value technology into existing systems, and that the pursuance of new systems is the highest priority, even in the event of cutting down unit numbers. (Economist 2010)

As ret. Gen. Diesen has said, at least a 3% annual increase of the military budget would be required just to maintain armed forces at their current readiness. Many research papers and studies have been made stretching from public sector research and evaluation to university studies (such as Queens University and Institutes for defence studies and analysis) showing that procurement costs for military equipment doubles every 20 years. A bit humoristic but becoming especially acute even after 30 years; Norman Augustine said in his law 16: “In the year 2054, the entire defence budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3½ days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.” And according to data available from the World Bank before the crisis, many European countries have maintained a flat level budget increase (no increase in military spending) or a small level increase that failed to maintain acquired military systems. (World Bank 2013).

After the crisis hit Europe, the military was on the front line once more as countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Croatia and Albania have had the biggest military spending cuts in terms of % of GDP resulting in a crippling effect for military systems and the reorganisation of armed forces to the extent where they become inoperable and cannot fulfill FRU agreements they had with either NATO or EU Battle groups. The military cuts were more prominent in smaller to medium sized countries as these were some of the most affected countries and needed to shift money to social systems and even abandoning modernization schemes to provide the money and thus forcing the armies to use old equipment or to abandon capabilities as maintenance levels were extremely high and safety standards were extremely low. The end result is that many of these countries field expensive armies which cannot operate or have limited operational capabilities even within a 200km region.

Libya was a first tell-tale sign of problems (Economist 2011). Although it was seen as a sign of renewed European interventionism in the region, it was faced with serious logistical issues that required our American allies to intervene once more to prevent a calamity. Or as Robert Gates said: “the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country – yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference” (Robert Gates 2011). I have highlighted the issues we are facing and now I will present what the solution is as Europeans see it and how this will not solve the issue, just postpone it.

Pooling and sharing, Smart Defence and similar initiatives such as NORDEFCO, Weimar triangle are bandage solutions while ignoring the problem as a whole. Europe sees regionalisation as cooperation between countries which share borders and many military alliances in the past started feeding on that wave. Europeans still have the problem for seeing ourselves as the centre of the world, the shining light on the globe. While that MAY be true it is not true from a geopolitical standpoint (or lack thereof). European projects from the 60s and 70s still try to adopt regionalisation schemes within the Continent while ignoring the globalisation effect of terminology and global Zeitgeist.

Europe as a whole is seen as a region in today’s international community (the theory at least) and all our initiatives should be built around it. The EU spends a lot of money on armed forces which cannot provide the operational units to tackle security issues in the 21st century. I see all these initiatives (Smart Defence, Pooling and Sharing . . .) as damaging for European security policy implementation as they still maintain the idea that national armies are the best way of providing security for our citizens – asymmetric warfare is not something most armies have adopted or shifted to. The ability to provide forces and have capabilities not on regional levels but on the continental level is of utmost importance and in the future, due to high procurement costs and budget problems, will force us to adapt to exactly that. It would be much wiser to abandon these regional initiatives and save money and time, by providing a medium term foreign policy strategy build around a European agenda as opposed to the current sub-regional one. Only this can give us the opportunity to stay and expand our role as a global player. On the other hand if we stay with present programs, the influence will dwindle even more and Europe will face a century of decline.

We need a person, or even more importantly an idea, that will push forward these goals in order to stay ahead of the game. Europe needs to create a geostrategic position which is not based on the idea that it is still one of the biggest open markets where foreign interests are still following, but a centred, unified policy where national security is only feasible when we stop pooling and sharing on a small scale and start building our future as Europeans on the European level.

Sources
Synergy of NATO and EUFOR in post conflict restoration management in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Matej Fugina
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Historical development of cooperation

The international community under the mandate of United Nations (UN) has deployed peacemakers to Bosnia already during the war — as UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force). Their field of operation: enforcing and maintaining security in UN Protected Areas, where internally displaced persons have taken refuge and where the peace process was accelerated. After the war, the tasks defined in the Dayton agreement were executed by NATO forces – firstly IFOR (Implementation Force) with one year mandate in operation Joint Endeavour and then SFOR (Stabilisation Force) with operations Joint Guard between 1996 and 1998 and Joint Forge until 2004. Participation in these operations was not conditional for membership in NATO. IFOR has established three multinational divisions in Mostar, Banja Luka and Tuzla, which were replaced with brigades during troop downsizing as the operational area has progressively stabilized. All the operations had the authority for peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

With the end of SFOR in 2004 all the tasks were transferred to forces of the European Union (EUFOR) with the operation Althea. Its tasks consist of the final implementation of all the provisions from the Dayton agreement, democratization of Bosnia and gradual integration in Euro-Atlantic (transatlantic) relations. Although Althea is a direct successor of SFOR and all the peacekeeping forces remain under the mandate of the EU, NATO has managed to remain an important or even an indispensable subject in the region.

EUFOR has transformed acquired brigades into three Multi-National Task Forces — MNTFs (Mostar, Banja Luka and Tuzla) with headquarters (HQ) in Sarajevo, where the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) also has its seat. Approximately 2000 personnel dispersed throughout Bosnia represented an intelligence and reconnaissance network in the form of Liaison and Observation Teams — LOTs.

In the year 2007 the security conditions have again been evaluated as positive and improving, which caused an additional decrease in the number of troops and disbanding of MNTFs. In the military base Butmir, remains the HQ, IPU and Multi-National Maneuver Battalion — MNBN. Presently it is made up of two motorized companies from Austria and Turkey with tasks of crowd and riot control (CRC), evacuation, cordon and search, LOTs extraction and supporting humanitarian demining efforts. Reconnaissance and intelligence network is represented by Regional Coordination Centres (RCCs) with the support of remaining LOTs and human intelligence (HUMINT) and open-source intelligence (OSINT) analytics.

Synergy of NATO and EUFOR?

The military base Butmir, an ex- Yugoslavian people’s army air force base located in the Southwest part of Sarajevo on the border between Republika Srpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, remains a centre of post conflict stabilization in Bosnia. In Butmir, HQ of EU’s operation Althea, together with IPU and MNBN on one end meets on a daily basis with NATO HQ (NHQ) Sarajevo on the other. EUFOR represents the authority in stabilization tasks as a fully legal successor of the Althea. NATO on the other hand, although a supporting element, remains in full command of the base and gives support in communications, logistics etc.

Both HQs formally operate separately, but cooperate in gradually integrating Bosnia in transatlantic cooperation’s with defence and security reforms. EUFOR can quickly respond to potential destabilization in the country with MNBN, which can be reinforced with NATO’s forces from Kosovo (KFOR) and by an Intermediate Reserve Force, a new rapidly deployable and capable force provided by six EU nations on call by the Operation Commander in the event of wider regional destabilization.
The IPU supports both subjects with battling organized crime, i.e., human trafficking, human organ trafficking, weapons and drugs smuggling etc., in cooperation with the local police (and before 30th of June 2012 also with finished EU Police Mission – EUPM which ended with this date). EUFOR also has a role in supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

It is hard to fully delimit the roles of NATO and EUFOR in Bosnia. We can notice the military commitment of NATO in the region and an interest to help forming the defence and security policy of the country in accordance with NATO’s common policy and strategy. On the other hand, the EU, with its relatively unsuccessful joint military force, focuses on the security and economic development of the Western Balkans and its integration into the EU’s common security policy. Synergy is shown in adapting and intertwinemnet of Transatlantic and European security and defence policy. Both increase the efficiency of defence budgets spending and using national capabilities of participants. At the same time NATO provides EUFOR with logistics support and the capability of regional cooperation but because of it limits the development of European military capabilities — on the account of cost-effectiveness without redoubling the forces and costs.

We can easily establish that best synergistic outcomes are a result of informal communication and cooperation which is possible due to national contingents with personnel working with both organisations and formally independent HQs working practically in the same workspace. Formal and legal information exchange between both organisations is time consuming and it is easier to gain information via social networking. Trends have shown us the problem of a lack of horizontal communication in these structures and a lack of coordination mechanisms, so informal situations are backing-up or replacing formal ones (e.g. using internet instead of intranet).

We can hardly generalize the current situation in Bosnia as being unstable and still in the need of a strong presence of foreign peacekeeping troops. The NATO’s and EU’s role is more of a bureaucratic sort. Bosnia is still facing a problem of unsettled ownership of military and defence infrastructure, there is a lack of control over weapons, defence budget is primarily distributed in personnel and too small amount of money is intended for development — but the latter is currently a problem for most countries since defence budgets are downsizing due to the financial crisis and economic stagnation. Still, both organisations have achieved a lot. Bosnian armed forces have transformed into a unified non-ethnic force despite administrative and political divisions in the country, considerable improvements have been made in the level of security, humanitarian demining, military educational system and training etc. These achievements are mainly produced as an outcome of proposed informal synergy with unclear distinction who is a who in this confusing ham & eggs breakfast — in the making of which the pig is committed but the chicken is only involved.

CROATIA AND ISAF PEACE MISSION

Croatia is one of the contributing countries when it comes to training and equipping Afghan forces throughout Afghanistan. By continuously participating in NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission since February 2003, Croatia has supported mentoring, advising, monitoring, and training of the Afghan National Army. Furthermore, Croatia has been engaged in activities aimed at supporting Afghanistan in governance and capacity building, as well as in minor humanitarian projects.

At the end of September this year, the 22nd contingent of the Croatian Armed Forces will depart for NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. The 22nd HRVCON comprises 154 members of the Croatian Armed Forces, two members of the civil police, and 22 members of the Military of Montenegro, including one member of the Montenegrin civil police. Upon completion of rotation, 56 members of the 21st HRVCON will enter in the composition of the 22nd HRVCON, bringing the total number of members in this contingent to 210.

It is important to mention that this is the second time the Montenegrin troops went to Afghanistan as part of the Croatian contingent, which above all, strengthened the partnership between these two respectable countries. Members of the 22nd HRVCON are stationed at the two Regional Commands: RC North (Mazar-e-Sharif) and RC Capital (Kabul). In coordination with other NATO nations and partners, they provide support and assistance to the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in generating and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and in establishing institutional capacity to enable accountable, Afghan-led security. In March 2011, Croatia took over the leading role in the support of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) in the operation and establishment of the Military Police School.
The main goal was to train and mentor members of the ANA Military Police (as part of a wider process of training the ANSF), and to prepare them for taking the responsibility for the security of their own country from the ISAF. In April 2013, they successfully took over the leadership of the Military Police School from the ISAF forces.

During this year, CAF members have been included (as staff personnel) in the ISAF Joint Command, which is responsible for the operations throughout Afghanistan. In cooperation with ANSF and relevant organizations, ISAF Joint Command supports improved governance and development in order to protect Afghan people and provide a secure environment. Equally important, they also conducted population-centric comprehensive operations to neutralize the insurgency in specified areas. In the forthcoming period, Croatia will, through its advisory teams, continue its engagement in the training and consulting, and will remain firmly committed to the Alliance’s efforts to support the Afghan people. The Croatian Parliament approved, on October 12, 2012, the participation of up to 300 Croatian Armed Forces members in ISAF mission from the period of January 1 to April 30, and up to 250 members from the period of May 1 to December 31, 2013 (Official Gazette – 115/2012). In accordance with NATO’s decision that member states can make assessments on their own on how many troops they will deploy in the ISAF mission, Croatia has decided to downsize its contingent. In 2014, Croatia plans to send up to 200 CAF members to Afghanistan, which is 50 soldiers fewer than it does now. In the context of reducing the total number of the CAF members, Croatia will introduce a new form of assistance as a contribution to the development of Afghanistan institutions, especially in the field of gender equality.

Finally, in the response to the new threats and challenges, Croatia needs to continue to develop new military capabilities, with emphasis on Pooling and Sharing, Smart defence, as well as on NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative. Croatia puts a great deal of importance to NATO’s operations in general, therefore Croatia will definitely continue to strengthen these ties and endeavor to prepare for the future challenges.

The CAF has been present in Afghanistan for more than ten years now and it has been involved in improving security, political stability and reconstruction of the country. Furthermore, we can certainly say that this mission has been the most demanding mission executed by members of the CAF to this day. ISAF peace mission is of great importance to Croatia, since, through its participation, Croatia could define and validate itself as a responsible member of NATO and of the international community. After all, Croatia’s engagement in this mission itself, presents its greatest contribution to the global fight against terrorism.

Although Croatia is (as well as many other countries) struggling with defence budget cuts, the main goal is to maintain current level of the Defence Budget in next three years. Currently, 50% of Croatia’s Land Force is deployable and 10% sustainable, and when it comes to Air Force 40% is deployable and 8% sustainable. Bearing in mind the protection of our national interest at sea and possible participation in NATO and EU operations in the Adriatic sea, it is important to maintain emphasis on Croatia’s Maritime Forces as well.

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ACS activities on fostering the security dialogue in Serbia

“Write as You Speak and Read as it is Written II” - Regional seminar for media representatives

During 12.04.-14.04.2013. In Ruma, the Atlantic Council of Serbia organized the regional seminar about security issues intended for media representatives, named “Write as You Speak and Read as it is Written II.” This is the second seminar of this type that we are organizing in a row, and as a sequel it was a much broader program than the first one. This evolution of the program was created by adding the speakers and participants from the countries of the ex-SFRY region to the former. The Atlantic Council of Serbia organized this project with the support of the British Embassy in Belgrade and in cooperation with NATO military liaison office in Belgrade.

In the opening speech the auditorium was addressed by Mr Boris Viculin, project manager of the Atlantic Council of Serbia, who explained to the participants and speakers about the structure of the project, after which he passed the floor to Mr. Giuseppe Belardetti – Secretary General of the Atlantic Treaty Association, who outlined the goals and framework of activities of the ATA as international umbrella organization consisting of, in this moment 37 national organizations, to which the ACS is affiliated since 2001. After this short opening speeches the participants and speakers were welcomed by Col. William English on behalf of the British Embassy in Belgrade as the institution that supported this project. He explained significance of this project in the light of security and stability as one of the main goals of the UK foreign policy.

The speakers in this seminar were assistant ministers of the Serbian MFA and MoD, representatives of: ministries of foreign affair and defence from the countries of the former SFRY, NATO PDD, NATO MLO, NSPA, Heads of various sectors in the MoD, General Staff and SAF in the rank of generals, representatives of NATO and Partner countries accredited in Serbia, analysts, journalists, university professors, various experts etc.

Conference “Serbia within security and economic challenges of the Euro-Atlantic area”

The Atlantic Council of Serbia in cooperation with the Megatrend University and Security Defence Agenda from Brussels, organized a conference, “Serbia on security and economic challenges of the Euro-Atlantic area.” The conference was held on 26.04.2013. at the Megatrend University in Belgrade.

The conference was opened by the President of the Atlantic Council of Serbia and Rector of Megatrend University professor Mića Jovanović, who described the new agreement between Belgrade and Pristina as a step forward for Serbia and give the recognition to the negotiating team. In his opening speech, the President of the Atlantic Council of Serbia said that the ACS fully supports the inclusion of Serbia in the global security system. Introductory speeches at the conference were held by the Serbian Prime Minister – H.E. Ivica Dačić, Mr. Miroslav Jovanović, - Assistant minister for defence policy, MoD and Mr. Jelko Kacin - the EP Rapporteur for Serbia.

Our guest speakers at this event were: former UK Defense Minister Mr. Doug Henderson, Deputy chairman of the Defence committee of the Belgian parliament — Mr. Denis Ducarme, professor Dr. Anton Bebler, president of the Atlantic Council of Slovenia, professor Radovan Vukadinović, President of the Atlantic Council of Croatia, Ms. Pauline Massart — representative of the Security and Defence Agenda.
“Partnership tour”

During 14.10. - 18.10.2013 the Atlantic Council of Serbia and Slovak Atlantic Commission, supported by the NATO PDD and SlovakAid and in cooperation with the Embassy of the Republic of Slovakia in Belgrade as the NATO Contact Point Embassy in Serbia, have implemented the „Partnership tour“ project in five cities in Serbia: Kragujevac, Niš, Novi Sad, Zaječar and Belgrade.

This project represented a continuation of years of work by the Atlantic Council of Serbia to extract the discussions about important security topics from the capital and analyze it with citizens from other cities throughout the country previously done through public platforms “Young people of Serbia today and tomorrow”, “Project of round tables and TV shows about democratic and civil control of security sector” and very successful public platforms about the Partnership for peace program titled: “Govern information in order to govern your future!”

This year, public discussions in the cities of Serbia represented presentation of experiences of the Republic of Slovakia about Euro-Atlantic integration, partnerships within international organizations and programs from this area, such as Partnership for Peace/NATO and EU, political, as well as the security, aspects of the former and national interests that states can fulfill through international cooperation. During visits to this cities, both ATA and YATA were promoted within the topic: “The role of NGOs and civil society in the process of strengthening the transatlantic cooperation and partnership.”

The goal of the Project was to explore the stated topics through presentations and speeches given by experts in the field (representatives of ministries of foreign affairs and defense) from the Republic of Slovakia and Republic of Serbia as well as some of the partner countries that have accredited representatives in our country.

With these projects we are fostering the discussions about security issues in Serbia by rounding the dialogue among three key target groups: decision makers and experts — through the expert conferences and seminars, mediators between the former and the citizens — the media representatives, through Write as you speak seminars and by direct contact with the citizens from all the regions in Serbia in the form of partnership tours in our country.
Resulting analyses of:
Afghanistan after 2014 and Regional Security

The current mandate in Afghanistan is terminating in 2014, after which most foreign forces will be pulled out. Only a small mission is expected to remain consisting mostly of training and mentoring staff. However, the international community remains concerned that Afghan stability post-2014 is at risk, primarily because of weakness and corruption in the Afghan government and insurgent safe havens in neighbouring Pakistan. It is clear that in order to ensure the stability and security of Afghanistan, constructive involvement of regional actors is needed. Currently, the surrounding countries, as well as other major players, have different and often conflicting interests. Prospects for the secure future of Afghanistan are overshadowed by regional conflicts (especially between India and Pakistan) and rivalries. Tense relations between the USA and Iran, as well as between Russia and the USA, could make the achievement of a common goal – a stable and secure Afghanistan – very difficult indeed.

Therefore, it will be a challenge for the international community and NATO to ensure smooth cooperation among regional players that would bring stability and prosperity to Afghanistan. NATO's major task after 2014 will be to develop strategies that would help to reconcile conflicting interests, and ease regional rivalries. The purpose of the workshop was to address the aforementioned challenges, identify the main regional actors and their interests in Afghanistan, and draft policy recommendations accordingly.

During the workshop the following countries and their interests regarding Afghanistan were identified: Pakistan, Iran, India, Russia, Central Asian countries, China, and the Gulf states. The participants were asked to first discuss each of the mentioned actors' interests, draft strategy recommendations towards those actors and evaluate how likely it is that those countries will act for the benefit of NATO's goals and Afghanistan's security.

Starting with Pakistan, the participants argued that the main interests of Pakistani authorities are the stabilization of Afghanistan and the security of the common border. The two countries share many ethnic groups, therefore violent spill-overs and the spread of extremist ideologies constitute a serious threat to Pakistani security. However dangerous the presence of Taliban is in Pakistan, its authorities have been heavily criticised for the lack of effort in fighting extremists. Unwillingness or inability to act has led to the US fighting Afghan militia in Pakistan unilaterally, often resulting in civilian casualties. This situation further threatens the already difficult cooperation between Pakistan and NATO. Moreover, Pakistan's relations with neighbouring Afghanistan are deeply affected by its conflict with India. Its goal is to prevent Afghanistan and India from forming a strategic relationship, while simultaneously trying to remain the most important player in Afghanistan.

The participants concluded that NATO should continue providing military education and training to both countries. A regional setting expanding the current AIPak agreement was also being considered, possibly involving members such as India and Iran. However, the participants agreed that until the Pakistani-Indian conflict is resolved there is not much room for manoeuvre. The conclusion was rather bleak: Pakistan is not likely to cooperate for the benefit of keeping Afghanistan stable after 2014.

In regards to India, the participants identified several important interests India holds in Afghanistan. First, India is also interested in containing radicalism due to the high threat of terrorism in India itself. Some extremists from Afghanistan have found shelter in Pakistan, from where they are free to plan attacks against India. Indian authorities are also aware of Afghanistan's huge natural resources potential and are interested in exploring it. As a close-by country, Afghanistan could provide a significant share of energy resources to power India's growth. The country has already invested heavily in the Afghan mining industry and is therefore interested in keeping Afghanistan stable and seeing return on its financial investments inside the country. Considering mutual cooperation interests, India and Afghanistan have already signed a strategic partnership agreement, which has caused Pakistani outrage.
Beyond Borders

Since India has the potential to contribute towards building a stable and secure Afghanistan, the workshop participants decided that the best policy recommendations for NATO consist of upgrading relations with India to a strong partnership. NATO should strive to encourage India in making investments in Afghanistan, as well as providing military training and education. Bearing in mind the above mentioned interests, the participants thought that India is very likely to act in a way that is beneficial for NATO's goals — keeping Afghanistan stable and secure.

Iran represents another crucial actor in bringing stability to Afghanistan. Currently it does not play a significant role, but in the long run Iran remains an important country. Both countries share a long border and some ethnic communities. It is in Iran's interests to protect those communities, especially Shia religious groups; it also hosts many Afghan refugees and would like to see them returned to their country. The workshop participants also emphasised that Iran would like to see the US and NATO leave Afghanistan as soon as possible, so that it could gain more power and influence in the region. There was an agreement that the tension between Iran and the US plays a significant negative role in regional dynamics. The conflict between those two countries prevents a deep and meaningful cooperation, which would be enormously beneficial to Afghan security. Iran has connections to both the Afghan government and the Taliban, so it could help in the negotiations between the two sides. This is one of the primary areas in which Iran could positively contribute to peace-making in Afghanistan. The participants believed that Iran could play a middleman between the various conflicting groups. Iran's provision of humanitarian and development aid to Afghanistan has also been noted. However, unless relations between Iran and the US are improved, there is not much expectation that Iran would play a positive role in keeping its neighbour stable and peaceful. Therefore, the main recommendation relates more to the US rather than to NATO — easing the tensions between the two rivals which would make cooperation on Afghanistan much more effective.

Regarding Russia and the Central Asian countries, participants pointed out many areas in which NATO and Russia's interests converge. Russia and some Central Asian countries suffer from a large drug trafficking route through their territory, and are putting a myriad of measures in place to combat this illegal activity. NATO and Russia are already cooperating on this issue quite effectively. The participants mentioned the geopolitical aspect of the relations between NATO and Russia. The latter is keen to see an independent Afghanistan acting as a buffer zone against NATO enlargement. Moreover, Central Asian states and Russia are worried about the spread of extremism, which could spark violent uprisings in oppressive states as well as in the outer regions of Russia, such as Chechnya and Ingushetia. Another reason for keeping Afghanistan stable is the possible outlet for trade with Pakistan and India; the whole region is interested in the revival of the historic “Silk Road” trading route. Some Central Asian countries share many common ethnic groups, and are therefore interested in avoiding ethnic conflict and violent spill-over.

The participants decided that the best approach for NATO towards Russia and the Central Asian states is to strengthen cooperation over border security and anti-narcotics operations. NATO should also provide military training and education to the weak countries of the Central Asian region. When discussing the likelihood of positive Russian and Central Asian actions towards Afghan security, the workshop participants were quite optimistic, as many interests converge and the countries are already cooperative to some extent.

The next discussed player was China, which was thought to have a lot of potential to work towards furthering NATO's goal of securing Afghanistan. China would like to play a larger role in the region in order to balance the power of India, Pakistan, Russia, and the US. As an economic superpower China is interested in getting access to Afghanistan's natural resources, and has already invested heavily in this area. Naturally, a stable Afghanistan would allow China to see significant investment returns. Moreover, violence in Afghanistan would threaten the Chinese Muslim community just across the border. Chinese authorities are worried about the spread of extremism, which could bring unrest in its own remote Muslim-dominated regions. The participants thought that the best action was to start a NATO-Chinese dialogue, which would help to encourage more Chinese investment in Afghanistan, as well as a stronger cooperation over the common border.

The final group of discussed players were the Gulf countries. Some of them have an interest in increasing trade and investment in Afghanistan. Another issue was the spread of radical Islamism which is a huge threat to some of the authoritarian regimes in the region. However, countries like Qatar are willing to negotiate to moderate Taliban figures and are already heavily involved in mediating the negotiations between them and the Afghan government. Given its recent prominence in the region, Qatar wants to raise its international prestige and to increase its role and visibility as an important regional player. According to the workshop participants, NATO should encourage and support Qatar in mediating the negotiation process. It was also agreed that the Taliban should be removed from the US terrorist list, which would help to engage a more moderate part of the Taliban.

The workshop ended with a lively discussion over which country was the most likely to cooperate for the benefit of Afghanistan. It was decided that India, Russia and Central Asian states were most likely to cooperate, while Pakistan was least likely to contribute positively to Afghan security.
European Union: A Global Superpower?

The first questions focused on by workshop participants were whether or not the EU should seek to be a global superpower and if so, what values are the most important for the EU to promote internally and externally to achieve this status? The first group, after 30 minutes of deliberation, concluded that the European Union should not seek to be a superpower in its common interpretation, namely, as a mechanism of global hegemony. The EU’s potential to shape policy discussion and its capacity to influence the international stage are ever-present, however, Europeans are currently occupied with their own internal problems, primarily related to the fragile economic situation of the monetary union. As a result, there is not enough appetite within the EU to reach superpower status until these internal economic issues have been resolved. Therefore, the EU must focus on internal reforms that make it more efficient at an institutional level. Only then will it be afforded the opportunity to attempt to strengthen its international position.

The changes that are necessary for the EU to increase its impact on the global stage must occur gradually. The EU must focus initially on becoming a regional power. This means that the EU’s foreign policy must be oriented primarily towards The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries, and the preservation of strong transatlantic ties. Only after gaining an unwavering and unified position in North Africa, the Caucasus region, and the Balkans, may the EU become a potential global superpower. We must also keep in mind that the road towards superpower status requires stability, both economically and militarily, as this will allow the EU to retain support from the US due to its large military presence.

The EU needs to continue its promotion of human rights, democracy, peace, reconciliation, and free market principles. These values should be at the very heart of European foreign policy. A strong voice in Europe is particularly desired when it comes to the contemporary situation in Egypt or Syria, where fundamental rights are seriously threatened. Advancement of these values should be supported by maintaining high-level humanitarian aid to insecure regions, or by increasing the number of people accepted as asylum-seekers. Fostering free trade within ENP should be considered a cornerstone for progress of a more unified Europe.

Towards deep integration

Another issue discussed by the first group was an institutional shape of the future EU. Participants were debating whether further integration will be fruitful for Europe and what kinds of changes should be implemented in order to foster this process.

For everyone it was obvious, that a highly-integrated system would be the best solution for the future of the EU, but to achieve this status several serious changes needed to be made in each major EU institution and in the Treaty of Lisbon at the same time.

First, the system of voting within the European Council must be changed. Unanimity should be replaced by qualified majority voting (QMV), and QMV replaced by simple majority. Unanimity sometimes is the biggest obstacle for an implementation of necessary reforms.

Second, The European Commission needs to be less unwieldy. Commissioners should be chosen on merit, not nationality. This type of inherent nepotism that permeates throughout the EC results in a lack of competent, well-respected experts with credibility in their fields. A more equitable hiring system would significantly increase the institution’s credibility, which would allow the EU to become a more efficient organization with a greater role in the global arena. There is a strong need to reduce the number of commissioners – not every state needs to have one.

Third, the European Parliament needs more legitimacy. One way to do this would be to synchronize voting times (make EP elections for a country at the same time as its national elections). Another way might be to limit its places of work, by concentrating all its activities in one city (Brussels). It would have also a very positive financial aspect.

Fourth, increase the legitimacy of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy — Representatives could be chosen by European Parliament. Implementation of this procedure could resolve another significant problem of the EU, which is lack of charismatic leaders among top European officials.
EU’s future expansion

The task of the second group was to examine where the “borders” of the EU’s further expansion should be aimed towards. The group agreed that in the near future the EU needs to take a short break from further expansion. A higher priority would be to create free trade (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreements) and to sign EU association agreements with its neighbors, such as the Eastern Partnership states. The EU has enough work as it is and needs to focus on the new member countries and strengthening their current members’ economic situation. However, debaters developed a short list of potential “EU candidates” to add within the proposed twenty-year window. Iceland is most likely to join the EU in the near future. With its strong democracy, high economic development, European culture and small area and the population, Iceland would not bring any revolutionary changes into the functioning of the EU. Even Iceland’s bank sector problems should not cause major economic risk for the EU from this point of view. Moreover, rich natural resources — oil and rare earth materials could have a positive impact on the EU’s economy. The plus is that current member states will probably not be opposed to Iceland’s accession. The most important argument against their accession is the Icelandic financial crisis and the collapse of their banking system, which caused the low financial credibility of Reykjavik. The other thing is that among Icelandic policy-makers there is not much political will to join the EU.

A quite different case is Turkey’s bid for accession. Membership of this state would have a huge impact on the EU, though that does not mean it is not worth it. In general, Turkey’s accession would strengthen the EU’s position on the global stage. A young, large, and growing Turkish population together with rapid economic growth could be a breath of fresh air for the future EU if the economic slowdown and aging of European societies continue. Turkey would greatly increase EU’s military capability. Ankara could play an important role in enhancing the EU’s voice in the Muslim world. It could bridge the Islamic gap between Islam and the West. Turkey is a very important EU partner when it comes to energy policy issues. Turkey within the EU would mean an extension of access to Azerbaijan’s natural resources, and a possible reduction of dependency on Russian gas. Major threats regarding Turkey’s accession are external in nature: the country borders Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Furthermore, Ankara is involved in two frozen conflicts: the Kurdish insurgency and the Northern Cyprus issue, where some of the EU member states are directly involved. Because of the latter, Turkey’s accession talks are being blocked (and will be most probably) and delayed by Cyprus. Other difficulties connected with Turkey’s EU ambitions are: cultural and religious differences (the population is almost entirely Muslim), and the human rights violations that could have been observed in May and June 2013 when anti-government protests were brutally suppressed by the police.

The group agreed on the future accession of Balkan states. EU membership could bring eventual stability to the region and settle longstanding issues. Russia was not considered as a possible member of the EU in the future, and neither was Belarus.

Strengthening transatlantic ties

The Second goal of this group was to discuss perspectives of transatlantic relations in the future. One of the issues was whether to rely, in the future, on NATO and the United States as the most important military partners? Participants were wondering if it is necessary for the EU to create its own military structures.

The answer on these questions appeared to be simple. There were no doubts that NATO and the US should be the primary military partners of the EU in the future. Defence issues — though advanced integration is generally recommended — should remain the responsibility of national governments and NATO.

First, creating a single European army would be an unnecessary duplication because nation states already have their own armies. Creation of single European army would create enormous spending, which the EU simply cannot afford, especially in this time of crisis. Moreover, a unified European army could be monopolised by one state, due to the inherent biases that routinely favour larger member states in the EU. Second, the EU with its own army could become a counterweight to US, which could result in a power dispute that could weaken the EU’s position on the international stage in the long term.

Third, the EU’s defence policy should be continued within the frames of the Common Security and Defence Policy, limiting security actions to police trainings and humanitarian missions under UN mandate.
The European Union and Syria

The last group was working on policy recommendations for what the EU can do to cope with major external and internal threats or emergencies. The first case-study was war in Syria. Participants tried to elaborate common European stand on recent happenings in this country and seek actions that should be taken by the EU in response to this situation (usage of chemical weapon by Damascus). Above all, the most important thing is that the EU can speak with one voice and send a clear message. Only then will the EU have influence on the political situation in Syria and be able to take concrete measures to resolve (or, at least, try to) this problem. Some of them are listed below:

First, the EU needs to impose targeted sanctions on regime representatives or any other actors involved in use and delivery of weapon of mass destruction: travel bans, freezing of banking accounts.

Second, the EU should put political pressure on Syria (“name and shame”) and seek a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court in the Hague.

Third, to increase humanitarian aid, simplify asylum procedures. The EU needs to engage in managing refugee camps what could be field of close and effective cooperation with Turkey.

Fourth, in order to implement policy measures enlisted above, it is highly recommended to cooperate with other regional and international bodies (NATO, UN, Arab League) and states neighboring with Syria (except Iran). The EU should support possible military intervention in Syria led by NATO, however the decision to send military troops needs to be decided at the national level. If needed, the EU could safeguard depots of chemical weapons.

How to tackle financial crisis?

The Greek question was discussed by the third group, as well as a case-study of internal threat for the EU. Undoubtedly, it was one of the hardest questions to answer and to elaborate policy recommendations. Particularly strong accent was put on prevention — the Greek case is difficult to resolve but it may be a good lesson for the EU.

The EU needs to improve elements of good governance and work on raising economic transparency in EU member states. One of the policy aims should be that no member state spends more than it “earns,” and possible savings need to be kept for the potential crisis in the future.

The fight against corruption and the “black” and “gray” market industries and tax evasion needs to be enhanced. The EU should cooperate on this field with national and international financial institutions: extremely important is an exchange of information to prevent a state from suffering an unreasonably high debt burden.

The EU must overcome its image of donor and sharpen its criteria of providing financial help. Each country in crisis receiving financial support from the EU needs to be intensively monitored by the European Commission. Lack of progress could be a reason for withdrawal of such support.

The EU should be more pro-active regarding the support of local markets and industries, which will increase the economic competitiveness of the EU member states. Therefore, financial support could be directed not exclusively to governments but also to private entrepreneurs who suffer the most from the crisis.
Beyond Borders

**Transatlantic Shifts: Who is Calling the Shots?**

In the first week of September, Riga, Latvia hosted a group of young leaders and bright individuals from across Europe and beyond, who are interested in debating the most pressing questions of international affairs. Given the competitive application process, those who made it to the Latvian capital truly displayed talent and future potential in the realms of politics, security, diplomacy, and journalism. This paper is a reflection on the discussions, disagreements, hopes, and proposals generated during the 2013 Young Diplomacy Professionals Forum in Riga. Based on the international character of the event, this report can be looked at as a manifesto of the Euro-Atlantic youth, and their take on the changing world around them.

One of the workshops, titled Transatlantic Shifts, took on the demanding task of addressing the issue of shifting positions of major powers. The central idea behind this theme was to look at the so called ‘Rise of the Rest’—rapid development of China, India, Brazil and others—and explain how this impacts NATO and the Alliance, and outline specific policies that should be embraced to cope with this new challenge. To add structure to the debate, young professionals were divided in 3 groups and asked to answer 3 strategic questions. These were as follows:

1) Identify three strategic actors (states) that NATO needs to engage with and why?

China represented the clearest consensus among the participants. Speakers noted China’s rapid development and leap into the new century as a major force. Clear reasons behind Beijing’s strategic importance were identified such as: stakes with regard to North Korea, Iran, cyber threats, and the environment. Concerns were raised about what kind of power China will be in the future and how its rise will affect the international order. Because of its growing weight in the international arena, China seems to display more self-awareness, confidence and nationalism, which in turn can shake-up the status quo of the system and cause instability in East Asia. Serious questions remain regarding China’s future behaviour, however, workshop participants agreed that naming Beijing an enemy from the outset would be counterproductive to NATO’s strategic interests.

It is clear that major powers will collide occasionally. Competition at times will take over cooperation, however, this should not discourage American and European leaders to extend their hand towards the Middle Kingdom. While there are differences between Euro-Atlantic and Asian worlds, most notably, on military intervention, there are also identifiable spaces for cooperation. China, for example, has provided more peacekeepers to UN missions than any of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. This shows that Beijing is interested in working within the current international framework, which America and Europe together control through some of the world’s biggest institutions, setting their agenda, and making the rules. When China tries to integrate into the system, it is adapting to the American and European value systems, and not the other way around. Engagement with China thus provides more leverage, while confrontation minimizes it. Therefore, workshop participants believed that welcoming China and not pushing it away should be the guiding principle for NATO. In short, cautious optimism describes the nature of debate on China and its future position.

This view echoes conclusions reached at the parallel Riga Conference where policy makers and experts addressed the same question. Huang Baifu, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies, for example, noted that Chinese ascendance to power will inevitably affect American and European dominant positions; however, in the long run ‘the rise of Asia will offer more opportunities than challenges.’ In essence, the same understanding was reached at the Young Professionals Forum.

India also ranked high on the priority list. Future leaders want the Alliance to make a strategic bet on New Delhi. As the world’s biggest democracy, India is a natural ally for both the United States and Europe. Its strategic value is based on the growing population and economy, relations with troubling Pakistan, and nuclear state status. India represents a stable democracy, with secularism and compatible values. Indian and Euro-Atlantic interests cross in the Indian Ocean where New Delhi has substantial maritime security interests. Moreover, India has invested considerable resources in rebuilding Afghanistan and training Afghan security forces. It is interested in a stable and politically moderate future for Afghanistan, which is also a top priority for policy makers in Brussels and Washington. To put China and India in the same package, young professionals recognized that there is a shift of power taking place from Euro-Atlantic to the Asian world. It is the size of economy and population that makes these Asian powerhouses hard to ignore on the world stage.

Though surprising, but not without reason, Brazil was also identified as an actor that NATO needs to seek closer ties with. Unlike China, which at times tends to shy away from taking bigger global responsibility, Brazil is actively seeking it.
Lead by Dilma Rousseff, the nation's first female leader, Brazil has opened up for new relations and strategic alliances, and is well positioned to become a hegemon in the Latin American continent. Speakers were aware of Rio's internal struggles - high corruption and endemic human security issues; however, Brazil's potential seems to be bigger than its problems.

2) How do you see the future role of NATO? Choose one of the two outlined approaches- 'Inward looking' or 'outward looking' and justify your choice.

Asked to choose between the two approaches, participants clearly articulated their vision in favour of an outward looking, Trans-Atlantic organization that serves as an ad-hoc security vehicle for various 'out of area' involvements. While NATO's fundamental task is to secure its member states, in a fast changing world, the Alliance cannot afford to sit and wait until threats appear at its doorstep. Speakers highlighted the need for new partnerships and engagements. Maritime piracy, cyber threats, and terrorism cannot be effectively addressed on an individual basis; these require global governance. Young leaders shared the belief that NATO needs a substantial injection of global responsibilities, ranging from the fight against human trafficking, combating diseases, and disrupting international drug routes.

Groups outlined a vision of the Alliance as a pro-active institution that differs from the Cold-War era version. Because threats are transnational in their nature, they have to be addressed with partners. Apart from already noted emerging powers, countries such as South Korea, Sweden, Australia, and Japan can be instrumental in assisting NATO's missions. This partnership can be, both institutional and operational, based on each partner's unique 'tool box.' In order to meet today's challenges participants also stressed the need for flexibility of structures, which would allow the projection of power without the long bureaucratic rituals. Crisis situations, like the one in Libya, call for rapid deployment of forces. According to workshop participants, a global mind-set, speed, and flexibility are the future of NATO's operational framework.

3) Imagine you are NATO Secretary-General, speaking at an important conference in Brussels. Give a convincing case of how NATO can still be relevant and effective in an era of austerity.

This undoubtedly was the toughest issue to tackle. Two concepts frequently came-up during the discussions - 'smart defence' and 'pooling and sharing' of resources. Young leaders agreed that there is work to be done with the private sector in order to better coordinate the manufacturing of weapons systems. It was recommended that NATO should be more creative and adaptable in its approach- renting and sharing technological capabilities between the members and allies. However, concepts such as 'smart defence' cannot serve as hiding blocks for members that simply are not interested in spending money on defence issues. One of the groups even proposed introducing certain punishment methods for those that do not meet the previously agreed 2% of their GDP allocated towards defence.

Overall, participants sounded a sceptical note on the current policies, and called the Alliance to think not only in terms of carrots, but also sticks if NATO wants to get its financial house in order. The same issue was also raised in the Riga Conference by the always vocal Estonian President, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who pointed out that 'if you don't follow your own rules (on spending) you will eventually end up in trouble.' This is not only a matter of internal debate and division of labour of who pays what. By not meeting self-imposed criteria on spending, NATO appears weak on the background of Asian powers that are investing big to re-build navies and modernize armies. The task at hand starts internally - NATO members need to seriously address the so called 'free-rider' issue, and establish which countries are security providers and which simply consume it. Alliances that share burdens equally and are strong from inside-out can serve as a cornerstone for security in the world. Only then will it be a confident Trans-Atlantic community that can successfully take on the challenges of the 21st century.

The main goal of the event clearly was to discuss today's hot topics and come up with specific policy recommendations. However, a note on the nature and form of the debate might be equally useful. While heated and polarized at times, discussions always displayed a great deal of respect for the opposing view. According to Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State and a well-known political figure, the capability to listen is a crucial skill if you want to belong to the diplomatic world. Every participant at the 2013 Young Diplomacy Professionals Forum seemed to possess this skill. While the Euro-Atlantic world faces tough economic times and challenges around the world, gathering in Riga proved that its future is still bright and there is plenty to cheer about.
Eastern Partnerships (EaP)
From Vilnius to Riga and Way Ahead

The purpose of the workshop “Eastern Partnerships: From Vilnius to Riga and Way Ahead” was to identify the key issues and challenges in NATO-Eastern Partnership (EaP) relations by discussing several questions and drafting relevant policy recommendations. During the workshop session, participants answered questions designed by the Moderator and then drafted relevant policy recommendations for improving NATO-Eastern Partnership relations.

One of the key issues discussed by workshop participants was to identify reasons why Eastern Partnership countries need security cooperation with the Alliance, and what lessons have been learnt from their collective contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

After intensive discussion, workshop participants agreed on the following: that the EaP countries need security cooperation with NATO as it increases their negotiating power and that EaP states need their Western ally and partner (NATO) to counter Russian influence in the region since Russia still considers EaP countries to be in its sphere of influence.

Workshop participants came up with an idea that strengthening ties of the EaP countries with the Alliance and other external partners could be considered as a solution to solve “frozen conflicts” in the Black Sea Region (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) and Moldova (Transnistria). Additionally, some of the participants stressed that strong EaP cooperation with NATO will promote the status quo to be preserved in the conflict regions.

After intensive debates about territorial integrity and political stability in EaP countries, workshop participants agreed that strong security cooperation of EaP countries with NATO might be considered as a guarantee of their territorial integrity and political stability. During the discussion, workshop participants stated that cooperation with the Alliance might also avoid the risk of totalitarian governances in these countries (for instance, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova). Therefore, workshop participants also stressed the fact that NATO’s cooperation with Eastern Partnership states has promoted the successful implementation of political, economic, and defense reforms in these countries; hence, NATO significantly influenced the recent positive developments and achievements that have been occurring in the South Caucasus, Moldova, and Ukraine (signing the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union).

Additionally, as NATO is a collective security organization—it may be perceived as a guarantee for international peace and security worldwide. Hence, Eastern Partnership have additional stimulus to deepen relations with NATO. The workshop participants have come up with a conclusion that EaP-NATO should strengthen and improve their relations in order to:

• Close the capability gap by continued participation in ISAF, as well as in other military operations, in order to help Eastern Partnership countries adopt modern training manuals; strengthen professionalism of the military forces; and to reach modern and international standards;
• Move away from the Cold War scenarios and capacities of deployment;
• Develop mobile, highly specialized units; improve military capacity and train military troops in accordance with NATO standards;
• Develop modern military infrastructure and military bases in accordance with international standards;
• Promote international peace and stability in the EaP area;
• Strengthen the rule of law, justice and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms;

In addition, EaP countries need strong cooperation with NATO, as such relations enable EaP to legitimate internal reforms that have to be introduced and implemented within the states (e.g. reforms in political, economic, governance and defense sectors).
The workshop participants concluded that the improvement of NATO-Eastern Partnership relations and further cooperation will also advance rule of law and human rights situations in these countries, because deepening relations with the Alliance requires achieving high standards and modern approaches to problem-solving.

The fellow participants have also designed several policy recommendations for NATO. The Alliance should continue military trainings and further cooperation with Eastern Partnership countries as such cooperation is a way of stunting the influence the Russian Federation has over them. Therefore, such cooperation will also prevent these countries from turning to Russia in the near future. Moreover, as NATO non-member partners participate in ISAF, it also shapes NATO foreign policy and its enlargement in the future. NATO increases its political influence on the external level due to political and military participation of Eastern partnership countries in ISAF.

After intense debates and discussion, workshop participants concluded that it is necessary and vital for NATO to design a comprehensive, united policy strategy towards EaP countries as designing a comprehensive policy strategy will promote further positive developments in NATO-EaP relations.

While discussing issues concerning energy security for the EaP, workshop participants agreed that:

- Azerbaijan has a key role in the region for energy security policy because of its wider resources on gas and oil; Azerbaijan can be perceived as an alternative country to import gas and reduce the dependence of the West from the Russian exports;

- The role of Azerbaijan is vividly important for the Eastern Partnership as it bypasses Russian territory, and contributes to transatlantic energy security (e.g. Baku-Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, planned Trans-Anatolian (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic (TAP) gas pipelines);

- By discussing NATO-Azerbaijan energy security issues, the European Union will highly benefit because it will harmonize policies between the Caspian region and the EU;

- NATO should be more integrated in the discussions related to energy security and cooperation in energy infrastructure (pipeline) development

- NATO can support Azerbaijan in the development process of HUB systems, interconnectors, and LNG terminals between countries to guarantee diversification of supply;

- Despite the fact that Azerbaijan already has several bilateral agreements with the Alliance member states on various issues, it is vital to continue this cooperation between NATO-Azerbaijan level and not only NATO members – Azerbaijan level;

- The Alliance should contribute more and become a forum to resolve conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia; NATO should play an important role to strengthen regional stability in the Black Sea region;

- The Alliance may also participate in the research and the exchange of expertise in frames of energy security infrastructure development.

Workshop participants also evaluated the issue of how Ukraine should overcome the status of “buffer” country, and developed some policy recommendations for NATO and Ukraine. Participants have come up with the fact that signing the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine at the upcoming Vilnius Summit in November 2013, will positively influence NATO-Ukraine relations and will also end the status quo of the “buffer state”.

Although, workshop participants evaluated the worst case scenario for Ukraine, and recommended that in case Ukraine and the European Union fail to sign the Association Agreement, they should make further efforts to reach a consensus about Ukraine signing the Association Agreement by focusing on a small scale cooperation (step-by-step approach) to overcome the existing obstacles and previous errors.

Workshop participants recommended NATO to present a lot of projects to Ukrainian society to raise public awareness and strengthen public diplomacy. NATO should implement similar recommendation towards other EaP members because the current lack of information about the Alliance, its standards, goals and values in EaP countries is significantly hindering popular support for greater integration with NATO.
The final topic that was discussed during the workshop by participants of the Young Diplomacy Professionals Forum was whether NATO, Russia and EaP members have common goals to achieve, and where the cross point for mutual cooperation stands. As far as NATO and Russia have different approaches towards solving territorial integrity issues, it was difficult to reach agreement about drafting unilateral policy recommendations for Russia and the Alliance. It was pointed out that at present, promotion of territorial integration for Russia and NATO is not a similar goal. However, workshop participants have identified the common goals that Russia, the Alliance, and Eastern Partnership countries may have and suggested that cooperation between NATO, Russia and the EaP is possible in the areas that are enumerated below:

1. Terrorism/cyber-terrorism
2. Non-proliferation of nuclear material/weapons
3. Disarmament policy (nuclear weapons)
4. Peacekeeping operations/resolution of conflicts (crisis management)
5. Cross-border environmental incidents (environmental policy)
6. Medical and humanitarian aid in conflict zones
7. Peaceful resolution of “frozen conflicts”
8. Law Enforcement cooperation regarding trafficking of human beings, drugs, weapons etc.

Workshop participants concluded that NATO should increase public awareness and use public diplomacy to support the change of public opinion in EaP countries towards NATO. One of the policy recommendations for the EaP itself is that member countries should actively support each other and cooperate in many aspects. In this regard, Georgia can share its experience with other EaP members.

Moreover, workshop participants came up with the conclusion that Belarus and the Alliance should open more channels for dialogue and continue cooperation based on mutual interests. Such common interests may be similar to those that are enumerated for Russia above. It has been suggested that regional security is important for Belarus as well. Overall, cooperation should be strengthened in areas such as civil emergency planning and defense reforms.
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